Greece has recently signed a historic agreement with the American energy giant ExxonMobil and partners Energean and HelleniQ Energy, launching the first exploratory drilling for natural gas in Greece after almost 40 years of pause. This deal marks a dramatic turn of Athens’ energy policy toward close cooperation with the United States of America. The signing of the contract was welcomed as the opening of “a new chapter in the energy history of Greece,” illustrating how much importance the authorities attach to this project. In the following, we analyze why this is the first such agreement after four decades and how it changes the geopolitical and energy picture of Europe — especially the Balkans — in the context of supply security, distancing from Russian gas, and new transportation routes.

Historic Agreement After 40 Years of Standstill

Block 2 in the Ionian Sea, west of Corfu, will be the site of Greece’s first offshore gas drilling since the early 1980s. For decades, Greece hesitated to exploit its underwater reserves — partly because of geopolitical tensions and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, and partly because of environmental concerns and the lack of major discoveries. For the past 40 years, a practice of non-exploitation of the seabed prevailed, until this turnaround. Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou called the new agreement a “historic signature” that ends a decades-long blockade of exploration. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis also emphasized that with this, Greece “writes a new chapter of its energy history” and that it is the first exploratory drilling in almost 40 years.

According to the agreement, American ExxonMobil takes over 60% of the share and the role of operator in the concession “Block 2” in the Ionian Sea, while Greek Energean retains 30%, and HelleniQ Energy (the former Hellenic Petroleum Company) 10%. This consortium will carry out additional geological surveys in 2025–2026, and the first drilling is planned for late 2026 or early 2027. Estimates based on 3D seismic research suggest that Block 2 could hide up to 200 billion cubic meters of gas, which, if confirmed, would dramatically strengthen Greece’s energy security and contribute to the diversification of Europe’s supply. Such a find could cover decades of consumption and reduce Greece’s reliance on imports.

The importance of the deal is also reflected in the fact that a high-level American delegation attended the signing, including the U.S. Secretary of Energy and other officials. They called the move proof of deepening energy alliance and “America’s return” to the Greek seabed. At the same time, this move provoked disapproval from environmental organizations, which warn that drilling in pristine marine areas could endanger the environment and distance Greece from its climate goals. However, the government in Athens emphasizes that the project will meet high environmental standards and that energy security is now the priority, given the supply crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. After decades of dependence on imports, especially on Russian gas, Greece wants to use its own resources and thus change its energy destiny.

Strategic Shift Towards a U.S. Partnership

This agreement symbolizes Greece’s strategic pivot towards the United States in the energy sector. The arrival of American oil giants ExxonMobil and Chevron (the latter selected in October 2025 to hold concessions south of Crete) represents a kind of “vote of confidence” in Greek reserves, as well as a geopolitical message. Experts note that the dual presence of American companies “significantly strengthens Greece’s geopolitical position” in the region. Exxon and Chevron not only bring capital and technology but also the political weight of the U.S.—their presence deters potential pressures from rival states. Experience from gas exploitation in neighboring countries has shown that Turkey, which has disputes with Greece and Cyprus, avoids direct confrontation in areas where American companies operate. Thus, Athens effectively consolidates its sovereignty over energy resources in its waters, with implicit support from Washington.

Historically, Greece was a close military ally of the U.S. during the Cold War, but it never had such intensive energy cooperation with Americans. Most of its gas was imported from Russia, Algeria, and via LNG terminals, and more recently from Azerbaijan. For decades, it avoided major exploration projects that could provoke disputes with neighbors or environmental groups. That course is now changing: Washington has designated Greece as a central partner in plans to replace Russian gas with American LNG in Europe. The new U.S. administration also views energy as a geopolitical weapon—“we sell energy to friends so they don’t buy from terrorists,” stated U.S. Secretary of the Interior Dag Burgum, alluding to the aim of keeping allied countries from being clients of regimes like Russia’s. This rhetoric, combined with policies of deregulation and encouragement of fossil fuel production, makes it clear that the U.S. is positioning itself as an alternative energy supplier to Europe.

For Greece, aligning with U.S. energy interests brings multiple advantages. Beyond the potential discovery of domestic reserves, there is technology and knowledge transfer: Greek officials highlight that the partnership with ExxonMobil brings state-of-the-art equipment and expertise previously unavailable in Greek projects. This could strengthen the domestic hydrocarbon industry and workforce in the long term. Moreover, Athens consolidates its role as a loyal Washington ally, fitting into a broader strategy of strengthening political and defense ties with the U.S. (recall that in recent years Greece has provided ports and bases for U.S. forces, while tensions with Russia rose after sanctions were imposed on Moscow over Ukraine).

It is important to note that this pivot towards the U.S. does not mean abandoning Europe; on the contrary, it aligns with European efforts for energy security. The European Union welcomed the inclusion of U.S. companies in the Eastern Mediterranean, interpreting it as a contribution to supply stability. Western powers indirectly reduce Russia’s influence in the region, as well as that of other actors: China, for instance, through investments in Mediterranean ports and infrastructure, also seeks influence, making Western energy expansion a counterbalance. In short, Greece has clearly positioned itself within the Western energy bloc, moving away from a previously multilateral (and somewhat passive) stance.

Geopolitical Implications for Europe: Supply Security and New Routes

The new strategic partnership has broader consequences for European energy security, particularly in light of the war in Ukraine and the cessation of cooperation with Russia. The EU decided to fully end imports of Russian gas and oil by 2028, aiming to deprive Moscow of revenue to finance the war. By late 2025, Russian gas accounted for only around 12% of EU imports, a dramatic drop from ~45% before the 2022 invasion. However, behind these averages lies uneven exposure: some member states, like Hungary and Slovakia, remain dependent on Russian gas and were granted limited exemptions and transitional periods. For the rest of the continent, finding alternatives to Russian gas has become a strategic priority.

In this context, Greece emerges as a new energy hub for Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Greek LNG terminals—Revithoussa near Athens and the new floating terminal in Alexandroupolis—already enable imports of LNG from the U.S., Qatar, Egypt, and other countries, which are then transported via pipelines to the Balkans and Central Europe. This north-south route, known as the “Vertical Gas Corridor,” includes Greece–Bulgaria and Bulgaria–Romania interconnectors, as well as modernized pipelines through these countries to Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The goal is for gas arriving at Greek ports to be redirected along new routes to Central and Eastern Europe, instead of the previous east-to-west flows from Russia. The corridor’s capacity is planned at around 10 billion cubic meters annually, enough to cover a significant portion of regional demand. Greece recently demonstrated its capacity by organizing the first deliveries to Ukraine via this infrastructure, symbolically showing that Mediterranean LNG can reach even a country at war, bypassing Russian networks.

The new gas exploration agreement in the Ionian Sea further strengthens this geopolitical puzzle. If commercial reserves are found, gas from Greek seabeds could supply the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which already runs from Azerbaijan through Greece and Albania to Italy. Energean CEO Matios Rigas noted that the site’s proximity to Italy allows potential TAP connection, enabling Greek gas to enter the broader European market. Alternatively, gas could serve the domestic market and regional customers via the Greek network. In either case, Greece positions itself as a key transit country—either as an exporter of its own gas or as an entry point for others (American LNG, Azerbaijani gas, etc.). Washington has therefore labeled Greece an “ideal gateway” for energy supplies—as a maritime nation with developed ports and tankers, it can receive LNG from America and forward it into Europe.

The geopolitical significance of these flows is immense. Russia has used gas as a lever of influence in Europe for decades; until recently, many EU countries (especially Germany, Italy, and some Balkan states) depended on Russian “blue fuel.” Now, new energy routes largely bypass Russia. The Southern Gas Corridor (Azerbaijan–Turkey–Greece) is already operational, American LNG floods European terminals (from Poland and the Netherlands to Greece and Croatia), and Eastern Mediterranean gas from Israel and Egypt becomes accessible via LNG or potential pipelines. The EastMed pipeline, linking Israeli, Cypriot, and possibly Egyptian fields to Greece and Italy, is also planned. While technically and politically challenging, U.S. support for Greek energy ambitions suggests Washington keeps doors open for such initiatives. Each new route reduces Moscow’s influence and increases Europe’s resilience. The Greek-American Ionian Sea agreement is thus not an isolated event but part of a broader mosaic restructuring European energy security after 2022.

Challenges remain. Exploration and production projects take years—ExxonMobil estimates that the first gas from the Ionian Sea would not flow before the 2030s, even if drilling starts successfully in 2027. In the meantime, Europe must rely on alternative sources and energy-saving measures. Yet the symbolic effect is immediate: it shows significant reserves (estimated at 200 billion cubic meters) exist in Southern Europe, and Western companies are willing to invest despite environmental criticisms. The EU signals that supply diversification is indispensable—even in the energy transition era, gas remains a crucial bridge to a decarbonized economy, under controlled conditions and from diverse sources.

U.S. Energy Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Greece’s move to involve U.S. companies is part of a broader trend of American re-engagement in Eastern Mediterranean energy. Over the past decade, significant gas reserves were discovered—from Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar fields, to Cyprus’ Aphrodite and Glaucus, to Egypt’s Zohr mega-field. The U.S. closely monitored these developments, increasingly engaging through companies and diplomacy. ExxonMobil and Chevron (after acquiring Noble Energy) are already active in Israeli and Cypriot fields, providing an economic foothold for the U.S. Meanwhile, the U.S. initiated political forums such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), bringing together regional states (Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, and even Palestinian authorities) to coordinate gas projects—excluding Turkey due to ongoing tensions.

By 2025, U.S. strategy in the region became even clearer. The Atlantic Council emphasizes that Washington’s key goal is “helping Europe disentangle from Russian energy imports,” with Greece and its infrastructure central to this plan. Senior U.S. officials attended the Partnering for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) conference in Athens in November 2025 to support these projects. Four U.S. cabinet members, including the Energy and Interior Secretaries, attended—an unprecedented level of delegation—alongside energy ministers from 25 countries and CEOs from Chevron and Exxon. The message was clear: the U.S. wants to guarantee energy stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe, offering both its technology and gas.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright emphasized that America has vast natural gas reserves and the “opportunity to replace every cubic meter of Russian gas in Western Europe.” This would benefit both sides—Europe gains secure, affordable energy, while the U.S. gains market share and geopolitical leverage. His vision: “Every molecule of Russian gas that does not reach Europe stays in the ground and does not finance Putin’s war machine.” Accordingly, the U.S. government has encouraged LNG export growth. By 2023, the U.S. became the world’s largest LNG exporter, much of it destined for Europe. By mid-2025, the EU pledged to purchase $250 billion annually of American energy (oil, LNG, even nuclear fuel) over the next three years, demonstrating reliance on transatlantic cooperation.

Specifically, U.S. energy policy in the Eastern Mediterranean follows two directions: (1) supporting partners in developing their resources (including Greece, Israel, and Cyprus through American investments) and (2) building infrastructure to channel those resources, including American LNG, to Europe. Exxon’s entry into Greece’s Block 2 and Chevron’s into Crete-adjacent blocks exemplifies the first approach, tying U.S. capital directly to future production. Washington gains an interest in guaranteeing stability—clearly backing Greece and Cyprus on their exclusive economic zone rights under international law, rejecting Turkish claims. The second approach focuses on infrastructure: the Vertical Gas Corridor to Ukraine, doubling LNG capacity in Alexandroupolis (potentially co-financed by the U.S. Development Finance Corporation), and potentially reviving the EastMed pipeline if conditions allow. Together, these projects integrate the Eastern Mediterranean into Europe’s market in alignment with Western geopolitical interests.

It should be noted that the American vision is long-term. Even as Europe accelerates renewable energy development and plans to reduce gas consumption in coming decades for climate goals, the U.S. assumes that “energy transition does not mean replacing one type of energy with another, but adding new sources to the overall supply.” In other words, they expect energy demand to grow and see continued space for gas—as a transitional fuel or for chemical industry use. Thus, the U.S. positions itself now, while the geopolitical situation is fluid, to secure a significant share of the future market. The Eastern Mediterranean is attractive: close to Europe, with substantial reserves and politically friendly states. Greece, as a reliable NATO ally and EU member, is an ideal platform. Strengthening energy ties with Athens consolidates a broader regional geopolitical architecture, linking energy cooperation with security—Greece remains a key pillar of NATO strategy in Southeastern Europe.

Contrast with Serbia and Hungary: Persistence in Relying on Russian Gas

While Greece is rapidly diversifying its energy sources and building new alliances, some European countries still firmly adhere to dependence on Russian gas. Serbia and Hungary stand out — both largely dependent on supplies through the Russian TurkStream pipeline, which runs from the Black Sea through Turkey and Bulgaria.

Hungary, an EU member, openly opposes sanctions on Russian energy. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government signed a long-term 15-year supply contract with Gazprom back in 2021 and has so far shown no willingness to terminate it. On the contrary, Budapest even threatened legal action within the EU when an initiative was launched for a full embargo on Russian gas by 2028. Although Budapest eventually had to accept the EU plan (with certain concessions for Hungarian needs), it is clear that politically it maintains a pro-Russian course. Russian gas covers over 80% of Hungary’s needs, and the country has no sea access or large LNG terminals, making it hostage to existing pipelines. Orbán’s strategy was to secure favorable gas prices for the economy through good relations with Moscow; however, the war in Ukraine and European policy have left him isolated on this issue.

Serbia, which seeks EU membership while balancing between the West and Russia, also relies on Russian gas for over 85% of its energy supply. Until 2022, Belgrade received gas via Hungary (during the 2009 Ukraine crisis, it temporarily ran out), and with the launch of TurkStream in 2021–2022, the main route has been directly through Bulgaria. In May 2022, despite the war, Serbia extended its gas supply agreement with Russia for three years at favorable terms — drawing criticism from the West but considered crucial for supply stability by Belgrade authorities.

Still, Serbia is aware of the risks of such dependence. Construction of a new pipeline from Bulgaria to Serbia (Niš–Dimitrovgrad) began with EU financial support and was successfully completed by the end of 2023. This interconnector, with a capacity of ~1.8 billion cubic meters per year (around 60% of Serbian consumption), now allows non-Russian gas to flow into Serbia — either from the Azerbaijani TAP pipeline or LNG terminals in Greece. At the inauguration, the presidents of Serbia and Bulgaria symbolically declared that they were “changing Europe’s energy map,” highlighting the lesson from the war in Ukraine about the importance of good neighborly relations and diversification. Serbia has already contracted the purchase of 400 million cubic meters annually from Azerbaijan starting in 2024, cautiously beginning to reduce the share of Russian gas in its imports.

However, both countries continue to rhetorically emphasize that they will not “turn their backs” on Russia. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić often states that Serbia will buy Russian gas after 2028 if it is “the most favorable” and does not want politics to interfere in energy matters. Similarly, Hungary seeks to secure permanent exemptions from EU rules — aware that alternative routes (such as the LNG terminal in Croatia or interconnections with Austria and Slovakia) cannot yet fully replace cheap Russian molecules. This stance increasingly contrasts with countries like Greece, Bulgaria, and broader EU policy. For example, Bulgaria, once 100% dependent on Gazprom, has now completely halted Russian gas imports and imports all its gas as LNG via Greece. Moreover, Sofia has announced that starting in 2026 it will stop all Russian gas transit through its territory to Serbia and Hungary, in line with a joint EU decision. This announcement is alarming for Budapest and Belgrade: it means the Balkan Stream (the continuation of TurkStream) through Bulgaria could be closed within a year or two, forcing them to fully switch to alternative suppliers or face gas shortages. Unsurprisingly, both Serbia and Hungary expressed “disappointment” — Hungary threatened an EU dispute over the unilateral shutdown, while Serbia’s calculations now include accelerated construction of gas storage and securing additional volumes from Azerbaijan and via Greece.

Comparison with Greece at this moment is indicative for the future of the Balkans. Greece, which once imported significant amounts of Russian gas (though LNG diversification had already reduced the share, Russian gas continued arriving via the Trans-Balkan pipeline until 2020), is now fully aligned with EU policy and even going further — aiming to become an exporter and transit country for gas. In contrast, Serbia and Hungary risk remaining islands of dependence if they fail to connect with new flows. The EU plan is clear and seemingly irreversible: Russian gas will be completely phased out of the EU system by 2027/28. This means that non-EU countries (like Serbia) will also need to adapt if they want access to European energy markets and funds. The EU is already financing interconnectors in the region to link the Western Balkans to alternative routes — besides the Serbia-Bulgaria interconnector, a pipeline from Greece to North Macedonia is under construction, Hungary is planned to connect to the Croatian LNG terminal at Krk, and there is discussion of enhancing the capacity of the Trans-Balkan pipeline in reverse (the old pipeline once carried Russian gas through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria to the Balkans, but could now carry LNG from Greece to Romania). All of this puts pressure on Belgrade and Budapest to diversify — otherwise, they could face isolation or shortages, especially if Moscow or transit countries cut supply.

Future Energy Map of the Balkans and Europe

Greece’s agreement with ExxonMobil goes far beyond a single business deal — it symbolizes the shift taking place in the region’s and continent’s energy map. The Balkans, once a dead-end of European gas routes controlled by Moscow, are becoming a crossroads for new flows. In the southeast, Greece is emerging as an energy gateway: through its terminals and potential domestic fields, gas enters the European system from the south and west instead of the east. Bulgaria, Romania, and other regional countries are rapidly connecting their networks in this new direction while simultaneously building renewable energy capacities to reduce overall gas consumption. In central Balkans, Serbia can no longer rely on a single supply route — now, with the new pipeline from Bulgaria, it can choose from whom to purchase gas. Judging by statements from its EU neighbors, Russian gas through Bulgaria will soon be a thing of the past. This means Belgrade will have to make strategic decisions: either reorient its energy policy like Greece (likely involving greater cooperation with American and European companies, investment in LNG infrastructure, and connection to EU markets), or risk becoming dependent on just one new source (e.g., Azerbaijan), which also carries risks.

In a broader European context, the picture is clear — Europe is effectively breaking a decades-long energy link with Russia. Where Russian pipelines once defined geopolitical relations (Nord Stream to Germany, South Stream planned through the Balkans, or the existing TurkStream), new corridors under the EU and US are emerging. Energy security has become an integral part of national security. Countries like Greece have understood this and seized the opportunity to position themselves as key players — leveraging geography and political ties. Countries clinging to the old order (relying solely on Russia) risk lagging behind or being seen as weak links to bypass.

For the Balkans in particular, the coming years could be decisive. If scenarios materialize — e.g., Greece producing its own gas by the end of the decade, LNG terminals appearing in other countries (possible new terminals in Albania, expansions in Croatia, a new one in Italy), and interconnectors linking all regional states — the Balkans could transform from a zone of vulnerability into a zone of resilience. Diversified sources and excess capacity would allow mutual aid in crises. Imagine Greece and Croatia, as LNG entry points, supplying the whole region: disruption in one route could be offset by another, and countries could store gas for each other (for example, Ukraine has large storage that could be filled in summer via the Balkans to supply Europe in winter). This vision is actively promoted in Brussels and Washington, as it enhances both economic and political stability in a region once considered Europe’s geopolitical “soft underbelly.”

Russia will not give up its share easily. It is expected to try to maintain influence through bilateral offers (e.g., discounts to Hungary or joint projects, offering Serbia gas storage construction) and by supporting political actors opposing the Western energy agenda. However, trends are unfavorable for Moscow: physical infrastructure is being redirected, and each new terminal or pipeline built in the Balkans is not connected to Russia. Even Russia’s favored tactic — investing in other countries’ energy sectors — is losing ground; for instance, Gazprom’s ownership of gas storage in Europe is under scrutiny or being terminated, and in Serbia, where Gazprom owns 51% of the national gas company, diversification is also a matter of reducing that influence.

For Balkan and European citizens, this transition should bring greater security against blackmail and shortages, and potentially more stable prices in the long run. With multiple suppliers and routes, it is harder for a single actor to dictate terms. Short-term prices have been high due to turbulence, but in the medium term, competition from US LNG, Azerbaijani gas, and possibly Eastern Mediterranean gas could lower prices or at least prevent extremes. American officials openly state that their goal is “to produce as much gas as possible to lower prices,” allowing allies to have cheaper energy. Ultimately, consumers benefit, while exporters rely on volume.

Conclusion: The gas exploration agreement in the Ionian Sea between Greece and American companies marks a turning point reflecting broader changes in Europe’s energy landscape. For the first time since the Cold War, a Southeast European country has positioned itself as a key player in securing EU energy and reducing dependence on Russia. This strategic shift toward the US brings political gains and investments to Athens, and influence and market access to Washington. The geopolitical implications are far-reaching: a new supply architecture linking the Eastern Mediterranean with Europe’s heart is emerging, with Western support and interest. In contrast, countries tied to Russian gas face their own choices — join the new order or risk an energy vacuum. By the end of this decade, the Balkan and European energy map will likely look very different from ten years ago: more players, more routes, and fewer dominant positions. In this new landscape, Greece’s move to pursue gas drilling with American partners after 40 years will be remembered as one of the catalysts for a major strategic shift — a change that re-centers energy in geopolitics, managed collectively and sustainably rather than as a tool of coercion.

/ / /

"Standard Prva" LLC Bijeljina is a company registered in Bijeljina at the District Commercial Court in Bijeljina. Company’s activities are accountancy, repurchases of receivables, angel investing and other related services. Distressed debt is a part of the Group within which the company repurchases the receivables, which function and are not returned regularly.

Lawyer’s Office Stevanović is the leading lawyer’s office in the region with the seat in Bijeljina. The LO abbreviation represents Lawyer’s Office of Vesna Stevanović and Lawyer’s Office of Miloš Stevanović.

Contact for media press@advokati-stevanovic.com or via telephone 00 387 55 230 000 or 00387 55 22 4444.